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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v . • : • 
LARRY NIEL BECKSTEAD, : Case No. 20030217-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to driving 
under the influence with priors, a third degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction of the 
appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly reject defendant's claim that he was intoxicated 
when he pled guilty where, although he smelled of alcohol, defendant responded 
appropriately during the plea colloquy and exhibited no signs of impairment? 
"[This Court] will not disturb the trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea unless it clearly appears that the trial court has exceeded its permitted range of 
discretion." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44 , \9 , 1 P.3d 1108 (citing State v. Blair, 868 
P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)). Furthermore, "the trial court's findings of fact made in 
conjunction with its decision will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." Id. 
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(quotation omitted). However, the trial court's compliance with procedural requirements 
for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, ^  10, 983 P.2d 556 (Utah 1999). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1999 & Supp. 2002): 
A plea of guilty . . . may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and 
with leave of the court. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e): 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, . . . and may not 
accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has 
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of 
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a 
speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-
examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the 
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights 
are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the 
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would 
have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is 
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by 
the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit 
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a 
substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, 
and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, 
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and 
plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
2 
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(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is 
limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the 
record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court 
has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged 
the contents of the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the 
English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been read or 
translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required 
to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence with priors, a third degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1998 & Supp. 2003). R3-4. 
Defendant pled guilty as charged at a pretrial hearing held on 18 September 2002. 
R41:10. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss another pending 
felony DUI charge (id.). The trial court imposed a 0-5 year term of imprisonment on 23 
October 2002. R7. Defendant filed a timely pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea on 
18 November 2002. R10. An amended motion was filed by his counsel on 13 February 
2003. R25. The trial court denied the motion on 14 April 2003. See Order from this 
Court, dated 25 April 2003. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (id.). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Guilty Plea Hearing. On 18 September 2002, defendant pled guilty to driving 
under the influence with priors. R41-.10.1 The trial court first informed defendant of the 
'A copy of the 18 September 2002 hearing transcript is attached in addendum A. 
3 
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nature of the DUI charge, see R41:4, add. A, and what the State would have to prove if he 
went to trial. R41:5, add. A. Defendant responded, "Yes, sir," when asked if he 
understood (id.). The trial court also reviewed the rights defendant would be waiving by 
pleading guilty. R41:6, add. A. Again defendant affirmatively responded, "I understand 
that." R41:7, add. A. When the trial court asked if he was "under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs here today in court," defendant responded, "No" (id.). 
The trial court next asked defendant if he had had enough time to talk to his 
attorney Mr. Miles, and defendant responded that he had not in fact talked to Mr. Miles 
(id.). Mr. Miles then stepped forward informing the trial court that Mr. Allan, 
defendant's appointed attorney, had had to leave and that he was standing in (id.). When 
asked if he had had enough time to talk with Mr. Allan, defendant responded 
affirmatively (id.). 
The trial court also asked if defendant was then on parole or probation, which 
defendant denied (id.). The trial court then explained the potential sentence: a 0-5 prison 
term, a $5,000 fine and an 85% surcharge. R41:7-8, add. A. When asked if he had any 
questions about the potential sentence, defendant responded, "No, sir." R41:8, Add. A. 
Finally, the trial court asked if defendant required more time to discuss the case 
with anyone (id.). Defendant indicated that he was "in charge of a bunch of livestock on 
the mountain" and that he would "like to have at least a couple of days to, at least two 
days to get them down and find somebody to take care of, take care of the animals" if he 
pled guilty (id.). The prosecutor interjected that the parties' plea agreement entailed 
4 
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defendant being taken into custody that day (id.). The prosecutor also expressed concern 
that defendant had been drinking because she could "smell it" on him (id.). 
When the trial court asked defendant about his earlier denial of intoxication, 
defendant admitted that he had been drinking that morning, but maintained that he was 
"not under the influence." R41:9, add. A. Defendant reiterated that his main concern was 
having time to find someone to care for his animals (id.). The trial court responded that 
she could make no promises and wondered if that would make a difference as to 
defendant's decision to plead guilty. R41:9-10, add. A. Defendant responded, "Not 
really." R41:10, add. A. 
Thereafter, defendant pled guilty as charged (id.). Pursuant to the parties' plea 
agreement, the trial court dismissed another pending DUI charge (id.). The trial court 
also had defendant taken into custody: "I understand your situation, but this is just too 
dangerous to leave you out with this kind of a situation." R41:14, add. A. 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Denied. Thereafter defendant moved to 
withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that he was "intoxicated at the time the guilty plea was 
entered." R25.2 A hearing on the motion was held 5 March 2003. R41:59-67.3 The trial 
court said it had previously reviewed the videotape of defendant's 18 September 2002 
guilty plea hearing and proceeded to hear the parties' arguments. R41:61-66, add. C. 
2
 A copy of the motion is attached in addendum B 
3
 A copy of the 5 March 2003 hearing transcript is attached in addendum C. 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant also addressed the trial court: "the officer that was here when I was arrested 
said[,] c[Y]ou've not only been drinking, Mr. Beckstead, I've been an officer for 25 
years,' and he said that I was highly intoxicated at the time and took me downstairs. . . . 
And after I sobered up I understood how I messed up, Your Honor. I should have never 
done that." R41:64, add. C. The trial court responded that the "real question [was] not 
whether [defendant] had been drinking, but as [defense counsel] points out whether or not 
you were intoxicated, whether you were so impaired that you didn't understand what you 
were doing at the time you stood here in court and entered a guilty plea. That's, that's the 
real issue here." 
Defendant also claimed that he was to have been given some time to get his things 
together, but "[a]ll that went out the, out the door[.]" R41:64-65, add. C. 
The trial court denied defendant's the motion and entered the following findings: 
. . . [A]s I look at the tape I don't see anything on the, the tape that 
suggests to me that you were impaired. And I didn't notice anything at the 
time we took the plea. I mean, I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't see 
wavering or, or having trouble standing up or talking at all. I mean, you 
seemed to understand all of the questions that I put to you and your answers 
appeared to be articulate and coherent. So I think the fact that maybe you 
had something to drink, I just don't think that that somehow impaired your 
ability to enter that plea on the, on the day that you did. 
So I'm going to find that we satisfied Rule 11. I'm also going to find 
that the plea in this case was both voluntary and knowing. And you may 
have been drinking, but I just don't think that you were under the influence 
of an (sic) alcohol to a degree that it rendered you incapable of 
understanding what was going on that day. 
And so I'm going to deny the motion at this time, sir, to withdraw 
the plea. And we'll leave the sentence imposed. 
R41:66, add. C. 
6 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
As acknowledged by defendant, the trial court's plea colloquy was complete. 
Defendant's plea was therefore presumptively knowing. Although defendant claims he 
was intoxicated at that time he pled guilty, his claim is not supported in the record. 
Defendant fails to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that he was 
not impaired or to otherwise demonstrate any insufficiency. Thus, defendant has not and 
cannot demonstrate any clear error on this record. The trial court's sound ruling denying 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea should therefore be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIM THAT HE WAS INTOXICATED WHEN HE PLED GUILTY 
WHERE, ALTHOUGH HE SMELLED OF ALCOHOL, 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES DURING THE PLEA COLLOQUY 
WERE "ARTICULATE AND COHERENT," AND HE EXHIBITED 
NO SIGNS OF IMPAIRMENT 
Defendant complains that his guilty plea was unknowing because he was 
intoxicated at the time.4 Aplt. Br. at 11-18. See R41:64, add. C. The trial court rejected 
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, finding that, other than the smell of alcohol, 
4Defendant also appears to suggest that his plea was involuntary. See Aplt. Br. at 6 
and 14. Involuntariness means official coercion. Cf. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 
167 (1986) (holding that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding 
that a confession is not "voluntary"). However, defendant's sole factual basis for his 
claim here is that he was too intoxicated to know what he was doing, a claim which if 
supportable, suggests an unknowing rather than an involuntary or coerced plea. 
7 
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defendant exhibited no signs of intoxication or impairment at the time he pled guilty. The 
trial court's ruling is well-supported and should be upheld. 
Presumptively Knowing Plea. The law governing guilty pleas is clear. "A plea 
of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of 
the [trial] court." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1999 & Supp. 2002). To withdraw 
such a plea "is a privilege, not a right" and is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. 
State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,1f 9, 1 P.3d 1108 (quoting State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 
1040, 1041 (Utah 1987)). "[A] trial court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11 in 
accepting a guilty . . . plea constitutes good cause, as a matter of law, for the withdrawal 
of that plea." State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah App. 1991). Conversely, however, 
strict compliance with rule 11 creates a presumption that the plea has been voluntarily 
entered. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ 11. 
Here, defendant concedes that the trial court strictly complied with rule 11. He 
only claims that he was unable to understand the plea colloquy because he was 
intoxicated. Aplt. Br. at 10. Specifically, defendant faults the trial court for not inquiring 
further, when immediately prior to the guilty plea, the prosecutor informed the trial court 
that she believed defendant had been drinking because she could "smell the alcohol 
emanating from [djefendant." Aplt. Br. at 14. However, defendant himself immediately 
assured the trial court that although he had been drinking that morning he was not 
intoxicated. See R41:9, add. A. Defendant's assurance was consistent with the trial 
court's own observations. As found by the trial court at the motion to withdraw hearing, 
8 
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defendant's responses during the plea colloquy were appropriate and he exhibited no 
signs of impairment: "I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't see wavering or, or having 
trouble standing up or talking at all. I mean, you seemed to understand all of the 
questions that I put to you and your answers appeared to be articulate and coherent. So I 
think the fact that maybe you had something to drink, I just don't think that that somehow 
impaired your ability to enter that plea on the, on the day that you did." R41:66, add. C. 
Thus, because the record indsputedly demonstrates that the trial court strictly 
complied with rule 11, defendant's plea is presumptively knowing. Gamblin, 2000 UT 
44, H 11. Indeed, given his concession that the rule 11 colloquy was "complete," 
defendant cannot prevail without demonstrating that the trial court's finding, that he was 
not impaired during the plea colloquy, is clearly erroneous. 
Failure to Marshal. The law is well-settled that while an appellate court reviews 
the denial of a motion to withdraw for an abuse of discretion, it will not overturn findings 
of fact made in conjunction with that ruling unless the findings are clearly erroneous. 
State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, \ 10, 983 P.2d 556. A trial court's findings are "clearly 
erroneous only if they are 'are against the clear weight of the evidence'" or if the 
reviewing court '"reaches a definite and firm conviction'" that they are mistaken. State v. 
Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193) 
(Utah 1987)). The burden is on the appellant to marshal all the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings and then to demonstrate that the evidence does not support the 
findings. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 460-461 (Utah 1994). If the defendant makes 
9 
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no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's ruling and to demonstrate 
its insufficiency, this Court "'accept[s] the trial court's findings as stated in its ruling.'" 
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 (quoting Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,1f 13). 
Defendant has made no attempt here to marshal the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings of no impairment. See Aplt. Br. at 11-19. Rather, defendant "has simply 
quoted those items from the record that arguably support his position." Gamblin, 2000 
UT 44, T| 17. That is insufficient. Id. Specifically, defendant relies on his own self-
serving testimony below that a booking officer with approximately 25 years of experience 
told defendant that he was "highly intoxicated" and the officer considered charging 
defendant with public intoxication. Aplt. Br. at 14 (quoting R41:64, add. C). Defendant 
ignores the trial court's findings, based on its own memory of the plea proceeding and a 
recent review of the videotape of the plea proceeding, that defendant's speech was not 
slurred, that defendant had no trouble standing, and that defendant's statements and 
responses during the colloquy were "articulate and coherent." R41:66, add. C. Thus, 
considering the evidence of defendant's non-impaired behavior and viewing it in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's ruling, defendant has not demonstrated clear error on 
this record. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ J 17 & n.2; See also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 
P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) (failure to marshal). 
In sum, because defendant concedes that the trial court's plea colloquy was 
"complete," his guilty plea was presumptively knowing. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ]f 11. 
10 
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Because defendant fails to the marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's finding 
that he was not impaired at the time he entered the plea, let alone to demonstrate its 
insufficiency, defendant fails to show any clear error in the trial court's finding. Id. at ^ 
17. He therefore necessarily fails to show that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Id. at j^ 9. His claim should therefore be 
rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant's 
sentence and the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on [0 December 2003. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
/Assistant Attorney General 
11 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(September 18, 2002) 
MR. MILES: Your Honor, there's one other matter 
that Camille has that we could, Larry Beckstead, 41. 
THE JUDGE: Forty-one? All right. State of 
Utah versus Larry Beckstead, on for the pretrial conference, 
case 1020. 
MS. NEIDER: Judge, in this case a, Mr. Beckstead 
was a, cited on June 22nd of this year with another DUI that 
we weren't aware of until this week. So the state's 
prepared to file that Information in that new case. And 
based on my discussions with a, Mr. Allan, Mr. Beckstead 
would plead guilty to the new case. For some reason he liked 
the facts better in that case. And I'll dismiss the old 
case. 
THE JUDGE: Okay.' 
MS. NEIDER: He's been given a copy of the 
Information. 
MR. MILES: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. MILES: Mr. Allan, Bernie Allan spoke with 
him, and that is our understanding. 
THE JUDGE: Now, do we need to have him waive the 
prelim and all that? 
MS. NEIDER: Waive the preliminary— 
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THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. NEIDER: — and he'll plead guilty on this 
case, Judge Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Do you want to read the 
Information or just waive the reading of the Information on 
this new charge? 
MR. MILES: We'd waive the formal reading, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. It looks like the charge 
is driving under the influence of alcohol. Essentially 
alleges on or about June 22nd, 2002 he operated a motor 
vehicle and he had a blood alcohol of .08 grams or greater, 
or he was under the influence or incapable of safely driving 
a motor vehicle. And this is his third or subsequent 
conviction within 10 years. Right? 
All right. And you understand, Mr. Beckstead, 
you're entitled to have a preliminary hearing on this new 
charge? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Yes, sir. I do. 
THE JUDGE: Did you want to waive your right to 
that preliminary hearing? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Yes, sir. Over the deal we 
made with the prosecution. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. And you understand what that 
means to waive your right to a prelim? 
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DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Yes, sir. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Does the state have any 
objection to the waiver? 
MS. NEIDER: No objection. 
THE JUDGE: All right. We'll find that he's 
freely and voluntarily waived his right to a preliminary 
hearing. 
Now, he wants to enter a guilty plea on this 
matter. Is that correct? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Yes, sir. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. And I just read to you in 
essence what the Information or what the elements of the 
offense are, Mr. Beckstead. 
If you went to trial on this charge the state would 
have to prove that you were driving a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol on June 22nd of 2002 here in 
Weber County, and they would have to show thai" you had a 
blood alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater, or you 
were under the influence of alcohol to a degree which 
rendered you incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle, and 
they would have to prove that you had at least two or more 
convictions within the last 10 years of driving under the 
influence. 
Is that what you did in this case? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Yes, sir. 
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THE JUDGE: Okay. Did you want to give me a 
factual basis again for what happened here? 
MS. NEIDER: Judge, on the new case a, on the date 
in the Information he was stopped in Harrisville a, and as 
part of their investigation they thought that he a, might be 
under the influence of alcohol. He did eventually take a 
breathalyzer and blew a point .085. 
He does have two prior convictions within the time 
frame. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. All right. And, 
Mr. Beckstead, again you understand that you're not required 
to plead guilty. You're presumed to be innocent. The state 
has the burden of proof here. If you went to trial they 
would have to prove that to what's called beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Do you understand that by pleading guilty you're 
going to give up a number of rights that you have. You have 
the right to what's called a speedy trial by an impartial 
jury. You have the right to have an attorney represent you 
and, of course, Mr. Miles is here with you today. You have 
the right against self-incrimination. You have the right to 
confront and cross examine witnesses. You have the right to 
have witnesses subpoenaed on your own behalf at no expense to 
you. And finally, you have the right of appeal. 
You're going to lose all of those by pleading 
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guilty here today. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I understand that. 
THE JUDGE: Now, you're not under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs here today in court, are you? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: No. 
THE JUDGE: And have you had enough time to talk 
to Mr. Miles about this? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I haven't talked to 
Mr. Miles. 
MR. MILES: Mr. Allan was here and he had to leave 
so I'm standing in. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So you had enough time to talk 
to Mr. Allan about this? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Yes, sir. 
THE JUDGE: And you're satisfied with his 
advice? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: (No recorded response). 
THE JUDGE: Now you understand we've got this, at 
least the other case set for trial here it looks like on the 
26th, and I understand if you plead guilty that's going to be 
dismissed. Okay. 
Now, are you on parole or probation right now? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: No, sir. 
THE JUDGE: Do you understand that this carries a 
potential prison term, you could go to prison for this for up 
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to five years. It also carries a $5,000 fine and an 85% 
surcharge on this offense. Any question about that? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: No, sir. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Do you need any more time 
to talk to anyone about the case? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: If I plead guilty, I'm in 
was charge of a bunch of livestock on the mountain, I have a, 
a camp. I'd like to have at least a couple of days to, at 
least two days to get them down and find somebody to take 
care of, take care of the animals if I do— 
THE JUDGE: You're not going to be sentenced 
today. I'm going to order what's called a presentence 
report so you'll have some time between now and— 
MS. NEIDER: Judge, the agreement that I had with 
Mr. Allan was that I was going to ask that he be taken into 
custody today. 
THE JUDGE: Oh. 
MS. NEIDER: The reason for that was, otherwise, 
otherwise he would have been felony on felony. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MS. NEIDER: And frankly, he's been drinking today 
and a, that concerns me. 
THE JUDGE: You say he has been drinking today? 
MS. NEIDER: I can tell he's been drinking. I can 
smell it. 
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THE JUDGE: I thought I just asked you Mr. — 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Well, it was early this 
morning. 
THE JUDGE: Well, I just asked you if you had had 
anything to drink, any alcohol or drugs, and you said no. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I'm not under the influence, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. You're not under the influence 
of alcohol— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: No (short inaudible, two 
speakers) this morning. 
THE JUDGE: — but you have been drinking. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I have a little bit of a 
back problem. 
THE JUDGE: Well, I do too but I don't drink to 
take care of it, so... 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: (Short inaudible, away from 
mic) . 
THE JUDGE: All right. Now, anything else we 
need to cover before we take the plea, Mr. Beckstead? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I just want to have time to 
get them animals and find somebody to take care of them. I'd 
appreciate that. 
THE JUDGE: Well, I'm not going to make you a 
guarantee. Okay? Would that make a difference? 
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DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Well— 
THE JUDGE: On the plea? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Not really. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I am (short inaudible, away 
from mic). 
THE JUDGE: All right. To the charge— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: — (short inaudible, no mic) 
cows. I don't have anybody to, to take care of them. I just 
need to get somebody up to take care of them. That's all, 
that's all I'm worried about is the cattle. 
THE JUDGE: All right. To the charge then of 
driving under the influence of alcohol on June 22nd of this 
year, how do you plead? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Guilty. 
THE JUDGE: All right. I'll accept that plea. 
And then you're going to move to dismiss the other case 
that's pending? 
MS. NEIDER: Yes, Judge. 
THE JUDGE: And that is the case that ends in 
1020. It's also driving under the influence of alcohol. 
MS. NEIDER: Yes, Judge. 
THE JUDGE: All right. We'll accept that plea 
and we'll also dismiss the other case. 
Now, do we need sentencing date on this? 
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: October 23rd. 
THE JUDGE: October 23rd. Okay. 
All right. Now, do we need to address this 
question of whether or not we leave him out awaiting 
sentencing? 
MS. NEIDER: Judge that was my a, that's what I 
told Mr. Allan that I would be requesting. Otherwise, he 
would be out on a felony on felony and we could have just 
tried that other case next week. I know he wants time to 
handle this livestock problem. But frankly, I think in 
the interests of safety of the public he be taken into 
custody. 
MR. MILES: Your Honor, and I, and I understand 
that she spoke with Mr. Allan. I, I guess we wouldn't be 
asking, from what he indicates it would just be a day or two 
to get arrangements made but— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Just two days, Your Honor. 
MR. MILES: — we'll submit it to, to 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Beckstead, have you got somebody 
else that can take care of your situation? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I've got to go, I've got to 
go out to (inaudible word) valley and find out if I can get 
the co-owner, co-owner to take over his share of them, I 
guess. I know this is, this is... I hadn't expected this. 
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I expected to go to Harrisville and (short inaudible, away 
from mic) down there to a Class B Misdemeanor, which is what 
they offered me. And (short indecipherable, away mic) right 
off the top of my head I don't know what I'm going to do 
here. 
THE JUDGE: Now I guess, my question is have you 
got somebody else that can take of your— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Not immediately, no. I've 
got to find somebody. 
THE JUDGE: Do you have family here? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Uh-uh (negative). 
THE JUDGE: Friends? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: My family all... No. 
THE JUDGE: Well, I tell you what, what troubles 
me is the fact that you were out awaiting trial for a DUI and 
then you commit the one you just pled guilty to. And now you 
show up in my court drinking. I mean, you are an absolute 
time bomb, aren't you. If I, if I let you go aren't I being 
a little remiss? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Your Honor, all I'm asking 
is 48 hours (short inaudible, two speakers). 
THE JUDGE: Well, I know what you're asking but, I 
mean— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: And this was part of the 
agreement which I've made with the prosecution, that I'd have 
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time to take care of this. 
THE JUDGE: I know. But I'm just a little 
concerned about, I'm troubled over somebody who's awaiting 
trial for a drinking offense, and then you commit a new one 
while you're out there. I mean, I gave you the chance to be 
out free on bail. And no.w you've committed a new crime. And 
now you show up in my court drinking. And I'm just, I'm 
kind of trying to figure out how, why I should let you go is 
what I'm concerned about. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I'm not thinking of myself, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: What? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I'm not thinking of myself 
because (short inaudible, two speakers). 
THE JUDGE: Well I know that, that's pretty 
obvious. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: (Short inaudible, two 
speakers)— 
THE JUDGE: What I'm worried about is those— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: — obligation of — 
THE JUDGE: — people out in Weber County that 
run the risk of having you run into them. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I'm not driving today. 
THE JUDGE: Do you have anything else, Mr. Miles, 
that you wanted to say? 
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MR. MILES: Your Honor, I'm a little tied because 
I believe that was what Bernie and her indicated. But I 
know Mr. Beckstead wanted to inquire about a couple days. 
THE JUDGE: Well, Mr. Beckstead, I'm going to 
revoke your bail and have you taken into custody. I 
understand your situation, but this is just too dangerous to 
leave you out with this kind of a situation. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Is there possibly a furlow 
for 24 hours, to get out for 24 hours? 
THE JUDGE: No. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: To take care of this? 
THE JUDGE: No. I've got you scheduled for 
sentencing on October 23rd. 
So you understand, Mr. Beckstead, you could be 
going to prison on this. This is not some misdemeanor 
anymore. You've got so many priors that you've now, you've 
now made it a felony so. Okay? 
All right. We'll see you on October 23rd. 
Okay? 2:00 o'clock. 
We'll strike that trial date then. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION 
) SS. 
I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify 
that I received the electronically recorded videotape 
#J091802 in the matter of STATE VS. BECKSTEAD, hearing date 
September 18, 2002, and that I transcribed it into 
typewriting and that a full, true and correct transcription 
of said hearing so recorded and transcribed is set forth in 
the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 15, inclusive except 
where it is indicated that the tape recording was inaudible. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 23rd day of May, 
2003. —x 
/ X' 
\ 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER 
License 2*M 0281 1-7801 
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-04 
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STEPHEN A. LAKER (#1870) ... _ _ 
PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC., ••• • - < ; ' ^ .-.-.... 
OF WEBER COUNTY 
Attorney for Larry Niel Beckstead C^wJ ; - > "r * » 
2562 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 392-8247 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, ' 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT FEB 13 2003 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
LARRY BECKSTEAD 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
PLEAOFGUILTY 
Case No. 021904375 
JUDGE ERNIE JONES 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, by and through his Attorney, Stephen A. Laker, and hereby moves this 
Court for an order allowing him to withdraw his plea of Guilty to the charge of in the above entitled 
matter. 
This Motion is made pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-13-6 and is based upon Defendant's 
following reason: 
1. The Defendant feels he was "blind-sided, bullied, coerced and rail-roaded by the 
Prosecutors". 
2. The Defendant feels that there was lack of support from the Public Defenders Office. 
3. The Defendant feels that he was misrepresented and let down by the defense attorney. 
4. The Defendant feels that he was intoxicated at the time the guilty plea was entered. 
So MOVED this 12 day of February, of 2003. 
STEPHEN A. LAKER 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
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STATE OF UTAH VS. LARRY BECKSTEAD 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA OF GUILTY 
Case No. 021904375 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the Foregoing, MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW PLEA OF GUILTY, this 12 day of February, of 2003, to: 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
CMC 4145 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
ENTRY OF PLEA 
Plaintiff, 
LARRY NIEL BECKSTEAD, 
Defendant. 
Case 021904375 FS 
Appeal 20030217-CA 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on September 18, 2002. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
V S , 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff, 
LARRY NIEL BECKSTEAD, 
Defendant. 
Case 021904375 FS 
Appeal 20030217-CA 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on March 5, 2003. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(March 5, 2003) 
MR. LAKER: This is Larry Beckstead, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. This was on, I guess 
there was, it was a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, was 
there not? 
MR. LAKER: Yes, Your Honor. Actually what 
happened was, was that he filed a, a pro se written motion. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: You ruled that that was, was adequate. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: You pulled me out of another court and 
I came over. And apparently you told me to a, to do... My 
recollection was you told me to talk to Mr. Allan about this, 
which I remembered doing. But I did not in a timely fashion 
file a formal motion to withdraw. I have subsequently done 
that. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. LAKER: And so we're here for oral argument. 
I need to let the Court know that a, Ms. Neider and 
I have been downstairs, we've reviewed the tape of the 
plea. I don't know whether the Court has done that as well. 
THE JUDGE: It's right here. Yes, I've looked at 
it. 
MR. LAKER: There isn't any question, Your Honor, 
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on the tape that a, that, that Mr. Beckstead had been 
drinking. I think Your Honor points that out, I think 
Camille Neider points that out. I think the defendant 
actually points that out. 
I think the question really becomes whether or not 
he was quote unquote intoxicated to the place that he could 
not understand what he was doing. 
In the colloquy to my, you know, what I remember 
hearing is, is that .you sort of chewed Mr. Beckstead out 
because he had just got through answering you are you under 
the influence of any alcohol or drugs— 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: — and he said no. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: And a, and then Mrs. Neider pointed 
out that he'd, that a, she felt like he'd been drinking. 
And he stated that he had, that he had had something to 
drink. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: And you chewed him out. because you 
said he'd just, just said he hadn't. And his response to 
you was you asked me if I was, if, if I was under the 
influence, not whether I'd been drinking. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. LAKER: And a, at this point in time he's 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
PAGE 62 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. euben Clark Law chool, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
alleging that a, not only had he been drinking but he was, 
had been drinking a sufficient quantity to be intoxicated and 
didn't understand what he was doing. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So your, your thinking is 
what, that he didn't enter a knowing plea, knowingly? 
MR. LAKER: Yes. That's, that's our position— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. LAKER: — is that he did not enter a knowing 
plea because he was intoxicated at the time. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Ms. Neider, anything you 
wanted to add? I did have a chance to read your response to 
his motion and— 
MR. SNIDER: Judge, I don't think there's anything 
on the tape that shows that it was anything but a knowing and 
voluntary plea. I think that he was definitely coherent and 
answered your questions. He a, responds appropriately. He 
doesn't seem to be swaying. There's nothing evident on the 
tape that would support his position now that he was 
intoxicated. 
And frankly, we're prepared to have Mr. Allan come 
over and testify if necessary, Judge, that it was his belief 
that he wasn't intoxicated. And we can still do that if the 
Court wants. But after reviewing the tape, Judge, I don't 
see that that would add anything other than a, what was there 
and what the Court could see. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
PAGE 63 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I just don't think there's anything in his motion 
that rises to the level of good cause. We would ask that 
you deny his motion then. 
. THE JUDGE: All right. Anything else, 
Mr. Laker? 
MR. LAKER: Anything you want to say? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Just that the officer that 
was here when I was arrested said you've not only been 
drinking, Mr. Beckstead, I've been an officer for 25 years, 
and he said that I was highly intoxicated at the time and 
took me downstairs. I said do you want to give me a 
breathalyzer (short inaudible, away from mic), because they 
were going to charge me with public intox (short inaudible, 
away from mic). 
THE JUDGE: Well, you know, I think the real 
question is not whether you had been drinking, but as 
Mr. Laker points out whether or not you were intoxicated, 
whether you were so impaired that you didn't understand what 
you were doing at the time you stood here in court and 
entered a guilty plea. That's, that's the real issue here. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: And after I sobered up I 
understood how I messed up, Your Honor. I should have never 
done that. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: And the state had promised 
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but never came through anyway. But as far as, this is as far 
as I remember, my plea bargain went out the window also 
because I was arrested and intoxicated. 
THE JUDGE: What do you mean by that, I don't— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Well, I was supposed to have 
been given some time to get my things together, a couple 
days, so forth and so on. There was mention of a minimum 
jail time. All that went out the, out the door when 
Mr. Allan left apparently. This is what I recall. I'm not, 
you know, when after he left and I pled guilty, the 
prosecutor turned and asked that you place me in custody then 
because I had been, I was intoxicated or had been drinking 
that day. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Well, the problem I'm having 
is there's no doubt that you'd been drinking. I mean, you 
finally admitted that. Although initially when I asked you 
that at the time of the plea— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Well nobody, nobody wants to 
agree— 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: — you know, it's a public 
embarrassment. 
THE JUDGE: But, but the question is whether or 
not you had consumed so much alcohol that you didn't 
appreciate, I guess, or understand what you were doing at the 
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time you entered your guilty plea. And, and that's why I 
looked at the tape again. 
And as I look at the tape I don't see anything on 
the, the tape that suggests to me that you were impaired. 
And I didn't notice anything at the time we took the plea. I 
mean, I didn't see slurred speech, I didn't see wavering or, 
or having trouble standing up or talking at all. I mean, 
you seemed to understand all of the questions that I put to 
you and your answers appeared to be articulate and 
coherent. So I think the fact that maybe you had something 
to drink, I just don't think that that somehow impaired your 
ability to enter that plea on the, on the day that you did. 
So I'm going to find that we satisfied Rule 11. 
I'm also going to find that the plea in this case was both 
voluntary and knowing. And you may have been drinking but I 
just don't think that you were under the influence of an 
alcohol to a degree that it rendered you incapable of 
understanding what was going on that day. 
And so I'm going to deny the motion at this time, 
sir, to withdraw the plea. And we'll leave the sentence 
imposed. 
Now, you do have the right to appeal that— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: We are going to appeal, yes. 
THE JUDGE: — and 30 days— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Yes. 
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THE JUDGE: — to file a notice. 
MR. LAKER: He has, he has asked me, Your Honor, 
to ask the Court for a post sentence relief, a release 
pending, pending appeal at this time. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Well, I'm going to deny that 
motion at this time. But you do have 30 days to file an 
appeal so— . . 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Can I orally file that right 
now? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. You need it file something in 
writing though within 30 days— 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I have. 
THE JUDGE: — but you certainly can put that on 
the record that you want to appeal the ruling. 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. LAKER: Are you going to handle that appeal 
through your lawyers at the prison? 
DEFENDANT BECKSTEAD: I'm not sure how we're going 
to do this. If you can file an appeal and get it done then 
I'm sure maybe we can have somebody pick it up. I don't know 
how fast I can get the paperwork done in prison and appeal, 
file it, if I can do it in 30 days. 
MR. LAKER: We'll file a notice of appeal. 
THE JUDGE: All right. That will be all then. 
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Good luck to you. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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